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The
Keiretsu Model
The
Enterprise Holdings System is being patterned after the Keiretsu
model that was originally developed in Japan. Our premise
is that micro businesses in particular need to take advantage
of a Keiretsu-type umbrella organization that applies state-of-the-art
information and communications technologies.
The
basic idea of the Keiretsu is that companies join into an
alliance where participating companies undertake specific
commercial activities such as transportation, finance, trading,
distribution and manufacuring.
Below
are excerpts from an article on Keiretsu published in The
Antidote in
1997. The article is important because it shows (1) that business
combines can be organized, start small and become very big,
(2) how they are structured, and (3) how cross-communication
is promoted and facilitated.
Keiretsu
- A Very Japanese Form of 'Alliance'
The name keiretsu
has become increasingly familiar to managers in other countries
over the last few years. But what their background is and
how they work is less well known.
Japanese keiretsu have existed for nearly 50 years
and can arguably be traced back much further (see historical
background on pages 32-33). Because they are often taken to
be a special form of alliance, this article sets out to put
them in context. We have used Keiretsu: Inside
the Hidden Japanese Conglomerates written by Kenichi Miyashita
and David Russell, first published in 1994, as a primary source
of information. Both authors live and work in okyo. This is backed up,
where appropriate, with information from Japanese Business
Leaders by Professor Andrew Kakabadse,
Lola Okazaki-Ward and Andrew Myers, all at Cranfield
School of Management in the UK, as well as material
from other sources.
Miyashita
and Russell point out that there is no direct translation
of keiretsu into English. The nearest equivalent are
words such as 'link', 'affiliate with' or 'connect to'. Keiretsu
exist in two forms: horizontal (yoko) and vertical
( tate). The main horizontal keiretsu are groups
of large Japanese companies, all with strong connections to
the same bank, who have significant cross-holdings in each
other's shares. While Japan's
11 big banks each has a cluster of companies around it, it
is the Big Six ( roku dai kigyo shudan or the
'big six industrial groups'), plus the Industrial Bank of
Japan, that tower
above the others. While each of these Big Six keiretsu
(Sumitomo, Mitsubishi Group, Mitsui Group, Fuyo Group, Sanwa
Group and DKB Group) has hundreds of firms in their extended
relationships, only a relatively small core form the keiretsu's
inner sanctum.
Vertical
keiretsu are different in that they comprise one large
company, its immediate direct subsidiaries
and then tiers of subcontractors. These hundreds, and sometimes
thousands, of subcontractors form a hierarchical pyramid with
each tier passing work down to more subcontractors, as the
keiretsu fans out and the companies get smaller and
smaller. These are not subcontractors in the Western
sense of the word. They are committed to the keiretsu
and not expected to work for anyone else. Some vertical keiretsu
have distribution, as well as production, pyramids.
The
interconnectedness of Japanese industry and commerce is made
more complicated by the fact that each member of a horizontal
keiretsu has its own vertical keiretsu, so the
total number of 'linkages' or 'connections' is potentially
vast. In this article, however, we will restrict ourselves
to the big horizontal keiretsu, leaving the different
subject of vertical keiretsu for a future issue of
The Antidote on supply chains and partnership sourcing.
So what is a horizontal
keiretsu? Pointing out that there
are many horizontal keiretsu in Japan, Miyashita and Russell
take the Big Six as the prime example. With the frequently
used analogy of a convoy, they describe each keiretsu
as a group of companies who have chosen to "travel together
and keep an eye on each other". In the middle of the
convoy is the flagship bank and normally sailing right beside
it is a vast trading company ( shosha),
often wielding the same degree of influence as the bank. Sometimes
there is also a big manufacturer at the centre of the convoy.
Around these two or three "giants" are other core
members, usually a life insurance company, a non-life insurance
company and a trust bank, as well as one or two more large
manufacturers. This group gives the keiretsu its identity.
Circling this core "are whole flotillas of firms, some
clustering together and some out on their own." Still
further out are yet more companies, some small and some large,
who, while associated with the convoy, keep themselves at
a distance.
The role of the bank The bank at the heart of a keiretsu is
more than just a bank. It is the "central clearinghouse
for information about group companies and the coordinator
for group activities." Because the early Tokyo Stock
Exchange had the reputation of being a gambling casino, Japanese
banks have until recently always been the source of
funds. As a result, all large Japanese companies have a special
relationship with at least one bank. As well as giving access
to funds, advice and valuable market information, this tacit
relationship provides the company with protection and assistance
in a crisis. In return, the bank gathers information and can
guide or encourage the company in the choice of who it conducts
business with - tending to prefer other keiretsu members.
As part of the relationship, the bank is likely to be a significant
shareholder in the company to provide "stability"
in its shares.
Because,
traditionally, corporate accounting and disclosure have been
underdeveloped in Japan, the bank also acts
as a credit monitor, using its knowledge of group members'
performance to assess and contain risk. Since other group
members have cross-shareholdings in each other and provide
each other with loans, the bank oversees these flows and provides
advice and guidance. Because it is so familiar with its members'
businesses, it can also act as a venture capitalist, supporting
R&D and important technical developments. The authors
quote Sumitomo Bank's support of investments in semiconductor
technology made by Nippon Electric Company (NEC). NEC "outspent
its rivals in semiconductor plants by roughly two to one over
a six year period in the late 1970s" but had to rely
on external finance for 85% of its total capital during the
period. Not only did the bank provide assistance, its recommendations
meant that other
Sumitomo keiretsu
companies provided about one third of all NEC's loans.
Finally,
the group bank acts as a highly skilled company doctor. If
trouble is looming at one of its customers, it has its own
well-informed team of executives ready to replace the existing
management, provide high levels of management expertise, and
steer the company round - one of the reasons why very few
large companies in Japan fail.
The role of the general
trading company Shosha,
the general trading companies of which there are many, are
a uniquely Japanese institution. Trading in everything from
iron ore to jumbo jets, the trading companies not only handle
Japan's direct imports and
exports but also operate worldwide, even when the transactions
have no link to Japan. This "third country
trade" means acting as the intermediary between European
and US companies and handling trade when both buyer and seller
are either American or European. The authors quote research
which shows that the Big Six trading companies are collectively
"the largest purchaser of US exports to the world",
accounting for 10% of total American overseas sales. Even
more surprisingly, they account for 4% of total world trade.
Once
highly profitable,
shosha now work on tiny margins. The authors quote
Itochu (formerly C. Itoh), the shosha
in the Dai-Ichi Kangyo (DKB) keiretsu, which in the
year ending March 1992 had sales of $160 billion but only
made $80 million profit - a margin of 0.05%. However, the
shosha act as intelligence
gatherers in their scores of offices round the world, providing
vital information and detailed market analysis for customers.
They also help clients deal with foreign governments, languages
and currencies. "In Japan, they distribute what
they import, and ship and store what
they buy."
This means that they
are critically positioned at the top of the distribution chain.
However, one of the most important roles they play is as a
credit provider for small- to medium-sized Japanese companies.
Rather than deal with a myriad of small companies, the banks
extend credit to the shosha,
which in turn finance trade credit between buyers and suppliers.
Because a deal is conducted through a shosha,
the seller needs to know nothing about the buyer since the
seller is only extending credit to a well-connected trading
company. In this way, they are immensely valuable to their
keiretsu because they not only smooth trade flows,
they effectively take over the financing function where the
big banks leave off.
The Presidents' Clubs Each of the Big Six keiretsu take the
date of their formation from the founding of their own "Presidents'
Club" ( shacho-kai).
Generally named after the day in the month on which they originally
met, these Clubs are attended by the chosen top manager (generally
the chief executive rather than the president) of the inner
circle of companies within each keiretsu (see Figure
below). In fact membership of the Presidents' Club defines
which companies form the inner core of each keiretsu.
For instance, although Mazda Motors and Matsushita Electric
are closely associated with the Sumitomo keiretsu,
neither is represented on Sumitomo's shacho-kai
- Mazda's main shareholder is Ford and Matsushita prefers
an independent stance.
Highly
exclusive, these monthly meetings are strictly confidential
and no outsider knows what takes place. Officially, they are
occasions at which top managers discuss broad subjects, such
as the economy, and listen to lectures from contemporary writers
and artists. However, some observers find it difficult to
believe that during the course of every month around 150 top
executives of Japan's
leading companies make time in their heavily committed diaries
for this purpose alone. Miyashita and Russell quote the head
of Mitsubishi's Presidents' Club who, in 1976, disclosed that
the Club aimed "to cultivate group solidarity" and
that its most important role was "to determine group
strategy and to plan group actions vis-à-vis external parties".
It also apparently dealt with the question of whether the
group should move into new industries, it enabled discussions
about the group's interests with other keiretsu, and
acted as mediator and adjudicator among group members. However,
as the authors point out, time has moved on and such issues
may now best be sorted out elsewhere. Most keiretsu
also have additional clubs for other senior executives and
some have a range of clubs and conferences to foster contact
and information flows at various levels.
| Name of
keiretsu |
Name
of Presidents' Club |
Date
founded |
Club
Members |
Average
cross-share
holding |
No.
of Affiliates (10% equity ownership) |
| Sumitomo
Group |
Hakusui-kai
(White
Water Club) |
1951 |
20 |
27% |
164 |
| Mitsubishi
Group |
Kinyokai
(Friday
Club) |
1954 |
29 |
35% |
217 |
| Mitsui
Group |
Nimoku-kai
(Second
Thursday Club) |
1961 |
26 |
19% |
171 |
| Fuyo
Group |
Fuyo
Club |
1966 |
29
(27 full time) |
15% |
223 |
| Sanwa
Group |
Sankinkai
(Third
Friday Club) |
1967 |
44 |
16.5% |
247 |
| DKB Group |
Sansuikai
(Third
Wednesday Club) |
1978 |
48
(42 full time) |
12% |
190 |
(Adapted
from Miyashita and Russell 1996)
Cross-shareholding After the Second World War, some 69% of shares
in Japanese companies were in private hands (see historical
background above). By 1989, however, banks held 42.3% of Japanese
shares and corporate holdings had risen to 24.8%, a total
of over 67% in non-private hands. A movement to create stable
shareholding, beginning with car manufacturers, spread relatively
quickly among horizontal keiretsu and then began in
vertical keiretsu as manufacturers sought to protect
their suppliers from take-over, binding them ever more closely.
Toyota, for instance, managed
to stabilise 70% of its total shares
by selling them first to the banks and insurance companies
of the Mitsui keiretsu, then to other group members
and finally to parts of its own vertical keiretsu.
In doing so, Toyota inevitably declared
its affiliation to the Mitsui keiretsu. However, few
companies have
stabilised such a large proportion of their shares - more
commonly stabilised cross-shareholdings
are in the 15-30% range.
By
the mid 1970s these cross-shareholding became institutionalised
and that has remained the pattern ever since. Because of capital
gains tax, there is a strong disincentive to sell assets that,
in some case, have risen by 300-400%.
Apart
from achieving their aim - foreign shareholding of Japanese
shares peaked at 6.3% in 1983 - there were other advantages
stemming from this system. Firstly, it cemented relations,
acting as part of the "glue" that holds the keiretsu
together. Secondly, by reducing the shares in circulation,
it tended to push share prices up, thus improving everyone's
ability to borrow money against these secure, rising assets.
Thirdly, and most importantly, Miyashita and Russell estimate
that around 25% of shares in Japanese companies are currently
held as keiretsu cross-holdings, with a further 50%
in the hands of banks, trust companies and insurance companies,
most of whom have keiretsu
connections. This has given management in leading Japanese
companies a freedom to act with a longer-term perspective
than most Western managements. Able to give precedence to
employees rather than shareholders, they can concentrate on
expanding market share rather than short-term profit.
Assigned directors As a final part of the more visible linkages
between keiretsu members, there is a tradition of assigning
directors. In the Big Six, the main bank, shosha
and other core companies will despatch
directors horizontally to other central companies, often for
years. These companies, in turn, send directors down their
own vertical keiretsu pyramids. As a result, constant
monitoring and the acquisition of high quality information
is facilitated. Both sides benefit.
The banks stay in touch, learning about incipient problems
early enough to respond and further increasing their huge
fund of information. The company knows that instead of having
to start from scratch to raise a loan, the bank will already
be aware of both technical detail and likely requirements.
A quiet word from the all-seeing bank also helps iron out
any troubles between group members.
While
it is not uncommon for directors in the West to sit on a number
of boards, it is the scale of these assignments that gives
the Japanese way a different perspective. Miyashita and Russell
calculate, for example, that within the
Fuyo keiretsu, Fuji Bank and other core companies provide
a total of 31 chairmen and vice chairmen, 74 presidents and
CEOs, 35 vice-presidents, 264 senior and managing directors,
319 directors and 180 'auditors' to related keiretsu
companies. Including all advisers and other executive staff,
over 900 senior personnel are on loan within the group. The
Sanwa keiretsu has more, and
DKB close to 1,200 on loan. All told, they calculate that
the Big Six have "posted" over 4000 board members
to other companies, including 400 presidents or CEOs.
A brief profile All
the Big Six tend to have at least one representative member
in most big industry sectors: in banking, insurance, mining,
metals, computers, chemicals, industrial equipment, shipping
or transportation, and property. At least four of them, variously,
have a significant presence in cameras and optics, oil and
coal,
fibres and textiles, car manufacturing, cement, food and beverages,
pulp and paper.
To
provide a sense of scale, the main features of each of the
Big Six keiretsu are shown in the Figure above, listed
by the date its Presidents' Club was founded. Clearly it depends
on which industry you are in as to whether you recognise
the members of these groups. The Mitsui Group, for example,
is a keiretsu that includes both Toyota and Toshiba. Other groups
contain names that are also variously familiar in the West,
such as Nissan ( Fuyo), Isuzu (DKB),
Daihatsu (Sanwa), NEC (Sumitomo), Sharp (Sanwa), Nikon (Mitsubishi),
Canon ( Fuyo), Suntory
(Sanwa), but many of the biggest Japanese companies bear their
flagship names, such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, and
are less familiar to Western consumers.
As
might be expected, however, nothing is straightforward. Some
companies are unusual and belong to more than one group. For
instance, Hitachi is a members
of the
Fuyo, DKB and Sanwa keiretsu. Others seek to remain
independent, like Matsushita, Nippon Steel, Bridgewater ( tyres)
and Sony. But most, although independent, have some level
of association with a keiretsu. Honda, for instance,
is an independent, but its main bank is Mitsubishi, which
has a director on Honda's board and is Honda's largest shareholder,
while the next two largest shareholders are also part of the
Mitsubishi group. The problem is that Mitsubishi already has
its own car company - Mitsubishi Motors.
It
is an integral part of conducting business that Japanese senior
managers are aware of keiretsu associations and know
who is affiliated or connected to whom. As Miyashita and Russell
put it, "Every executive of every major company knows
who does business with whom in the same way he knows the names
of important world capitals: he can't remember where or when
he learned them, just that it's important not to forget and
that you sound like an idiot if you say London is in France."
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